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 Abstract  
The recent corporate scandals and the rise of financial crisis have led up 
to the light the issue of corporate governance and CEO compensation. 
Researchers, business people and politicians have focused on this topic 
analyzing the elements that can increase firm and social wealth, give 
incentives and reduce agency costs between managers and 
shareholders. 
Although most of the studies focus on unregulated firms, this topic is 
more controversial and interesting in public utility case. After the 
privatization, most of public utilities listed, opening their capital to 
private investors that want that firm maximizes shareholder wealth. 
Nevertheless, these companies still work in a regulated environment 
which creates constraints on their behaviours and their governance. 
Moreover, directors have relationships with governments and 
politicians that can distort their decisions. 
Using a unique dataset that includes governance, financial and market 
regulation variables I study corporate governance and CEO incentives 
in the energy sector. 
The first chapter analyses the determinants of CEO compensation. In 
theory, the variable part of CEO compensation is an instrument that 
better aligns CEO interests with those of the shareholders. Contrary to 
the previous studies in unregulated case, I find a negative relation 
between the number of independent directors and the variable part of 
CEO compensation. This conclusion leads to deepen the role of 
independent directors. Since independent directors do not have 
connections with the company, they should be particularly effective in 
controlling CEOs’ actions, avoiding rent expropriation.  
The second chapter analyses the effects of board composition on firm 
performance, growth and dividend policy. I find that greater board 
independence reduces future firm performance and does not affect firm 
growth and dividends policy.  
The third chapter examines CEO pay for performance sensitivity across 
regulated and unregulated firms within the energy sector. The study 
analyzes also the effect of different regulatory frameworks, in order to 
understand if external (regulation) and internal (compensation) 
incentives are powerful mechanisms that motivate CEOs.  
 6 
 
 1.  The determinants of CEO compensation in the public 
utilities of the energy sector: An empirical analysis∗ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Most empirical studies have examined the determinants of CEO 
compensation in unregulated firms in US. This paper analyses the 
determinants of CEO compensation, considering listed energy utilities 
of Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. Consistent with the previous 
studies the results show that the board size affects positively the 
variable part of CEO compensation and CEO total wealth, suggesting 
that larger boards are more susceptible to the influence of the CEO. 
Contrary to previous studies on unregulated firms, I find a negative 
relationship between the number of independent directors and the 
variable part of CEO compensation as well that the number of insider 
directors does not affect CEO compensation. Specifically, the results 
show that an increase in the number of independent directors leads to a 
decrease in the level and in the change of the variable part of CEO 
compensation, and in the level of total CEO wealth. These findings are 
consistent with the view that independent directors are more effective 
than other directors in monitoring CEO and in avoiding CEO rent 
extraction and excess CEO compensation. But, at the same time, they 
prefer to set a compensation that is less tied to firm performance and 
bonus.  
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G30; J33; L95 
Keywords: Corporate governance; CEO compensation; Board-of-
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∗ I am grateful to Prof. Kose John and Prof. David Yermack for the useful comments, Prof. 
Fabrizio Ferri and Martin K. Hansen for the help with data. I also thank NYU PhD 
students (among others Georg Wernicke, Hong Luo and Jennifer Jang) and all 
participants at the First International Conference in Economics and Management of 
Public Utilities in Bocconi University and at the PhD students seminar in New York 
University. 
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2.  The effectiveness of independent directors is not an 
issue of numbers: the case of energy utility in Europe∗ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The introduction of corporate governance codes in Europe has stressed 
on the importance of boards of directors dominated by independent 
directors. Many commentators and institutional investors believe that 
independent directors are particularly effective in controlling CEO’s 
actions, pushing him to take decisions to improve firm performance, 
growth and dividend policy. We conduct a study of whether 
independent directors and other board variables correlate with the 
performance, the growth and the dividend policy of European public 
utilities. We find evidence that independent directors reduce future 
firm performance and that they do not affect neither firm growth nor 
dividend policy. Using different econometric techniques and 
controlling for endogeneity, our results do not support the 
conventional wisdom of corporate governance codes that greater board 
independence improves firm results. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G30; L32, L95 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board-of-directors; Public utility, 
Firm performance, Board Independence. 
                                                                  
∗ The co-authors are Claudio Becagli, Research Fellow at University of Florence and 
Andrea Paci, Full Professor at University of Florence. 
We would like to thank all participants at EBEN Annual Conference 2010 and at ISLE 
Annual Conference in Law and Economics 2010 for the helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
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3.  Incentive regulation and incentive compensation: 
What has changed in the pattern of EU energy utilities?∗ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines regulatory mechanisms and regulated firms’ CEO 
compensations within public utilities using a panel of energy utilities in 
the largest European countries. We investigate the differences in CEO 
pay-for-performance sensitivity across regulated and unregulated firms 
as well as the impact of different regulation schemes – incentive 
regulation vs. rate-of-return regulation - on CEO monetary incentives. 
We employ three different measures of firm performance and find that 
there is a positive and statistically significant pay-for-performance 
relationship. Results show that regulated energy utilities link CEO 
compensation to firm performance, but sensitivity is lower with respect 
to unregulated companies. When we focus on regulatory schemes, we 
find no difference in across the CEO pay-sensitivities of firms under 
incentive regulation and RoR regulation, and also that CEOs of firms 
under incentive regulation are paid relatively more than CEOs of firms 
under cost-plus mechanisms. Overall, our results point out that CEO 
incentives are not very powerful and ought to be strengthened. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G30, J33, L51, M12 
Key words: Incentive regulation, CEO pay for performance sensitivity, 
energy utilities 
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